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I. Introduction
This Article, the tenth in a series,' tabulates and analyzes the vot-
ing behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 1994
Term.2 Our tabulations and statistical analysis are designed to identify
movement in the ideological leanings of individual Justices and of the
Court as an institution. This analysis, which has been limited to ascer-
taining trends in voting patterns within ten defined categories of
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
** J.D. candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1996;
M.A., Arizona State University, 1992.
*** J.D. candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1997.
** J.D. candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1996;
Adjunct Professor of Business Management, Utah Valley State College.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this Study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1986 Term, 2 B.Y.U. J. Ptm. L. 15 (1988).
2. The 1994 Term covers decisions made from October 1994 to October 1995.
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cases,3 has been somewhat expanded this year. In addition to a
number of qualitative analyses of the numerical results in each of the
ten categories, we have employed a quantitative regression analysis to
determine whether any ideological movement within the categories is
statistically significant, whether the statistics generated by this Study
have any predictive value, and whether particular Justices tend to vote
together within the identified categories of cases. This year's results
reveal not only that the Rehnquist Court is moving slightly toward the
ideological center, but also that there are identifiable correlations be-
tween the voting patterns of the longest-termed Justices.
First, although the Rehnquist Court is accurately perceived as a
"conservative" institution,4 seven of the ten categories of cases this
Term indicate "liberal" movement by the Court. In 1994, the Court
cast more votes against the federal government in civil and criminal
litigation (Tables 2 and 4), upheld more First Amendment claims (Ta-
ble 5), voted in favor of more statutory civil rights claims (Table 7),
rejected more limits on its jurisdiction (Table 8), and decided more
disputes involving clashes between state and federal power in favor of
the federal sovereign (Table 9) than it had in the preceding year. In
addition, while nearly two-thirds of the cases decided by a five-to-four
vote in 1993 were decided by voting coalitions reaching a conservative
result, in an abrupt reversal, nearly two-thirds of the cases decided by
one vote last year reached a liberal result (Table 10).
What does this indicate? Is the Rehnquist Court, which is popu-
larly described as decidedly (if not extremely) conservative,5 now
charting a liberal course? Well, yes and no.
To begin with, the data is not conclusive. It is possible that this
Study demonstrates liberal movement only because of its definitional
stance. As explained in Section II below, we classify as "liberal" any
vote against an assertion of governmental power and in favor of indi-
vidual rights, and label as "conservative" any contrary vote. Accord-
ingly, some of the liberal movement shown on Tables 2 and 4 (federal
3. See infra Tables 1-10.
4. Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 HAS-
'rINGs CONsT. L.Q. 269, 312 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Court's Conservatives Make Presence Felt: Reagan Appoin-
tees Lead Move Rightward, WASH. PosT, July 2, 1995, at Al; Richard Carelli, Verdict is in:
This Supreme Court Has Taken Sharp Turn to the Right Five Jurists Usually Stick Together
to Form Conservative Bloc, BuFFALo NEWS, June 30, 1995, at A6; James A. Finefrock,
Waiting for Breyer Lacking Leadership From the Center, The U.S. Supreme Court Turns in
a Mediocre Year, Dominated by an Outnumbered Right Wing, S.F. EXAMINER, July 6, 1995,
at A16; David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rulings Herald Rehnquist Era, L.A. TIMES, July
2, 1995, at Al.
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civil and criminal litigation) may result from a politically conservative
Court voting against the litigating posture of the politically liberal
Clinton Administration. Similarly, the liberal results on Table 5 (First
Amendment) flow at least in part from the Court's votes in favor of
free speech claims made by politically conservative groups. 6 More-
over, the liberal movement noted on at least one of the tables this
Term may not be reliable: Table 7 (statutory civil rights claims) tabu-
lates the outcome of a mere four cases, a sample too small to have
much statistical validity. Accordingly, the assertion that the Court has
moved in a liberal direction in 1994 is not beyond question.
Nevertheless, the trend demonstrated by this Term's data cannot
be entirely discounted. In 1994, the Court-virtually across the
board-cast significantly more liberal votes than in 1993. This sugges-
tion of some liberal movement is reinforced by analysis of Table 1
(state civil litigation), Table 3 (state criminal litigation) and Table 6
(equal protection claims).
Tables 1, 3 and 6 contain the only data indicating a possible con-
servative voting trend during the 1994 Term. That indication, how-
ever, is exceedingly weak. Table 1 shows a mere four-point increase in
the percentage of civil cases decided in favor of state government.
While this figure demonstrates conservative movement since 1993, the
1994 percentage of cases decided in favor of state governments is still
well below the percentage of cases won by state governments in prior
years.7 Similarly, any conservative trend on Table 3 (state criminal
cases) is indeed feeble, with the Court voting a mere two percentage
points more often in favor of the states in 1994 than in 1993.
The conservative movement on Table 6 (equal protection), more-
over, is not highly reliable, since it is based on the decisions of only
three cases. These weak indicators of conservative movement, when
contrasted with the more broadly based liberal movement on the
other seven tables, imply that the Court in 1994 was in fact moving in
a more liberal direction than during the prior Term.
6. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510
(1995) (conservative five-member majority upholds First Amendment claim of religious
student publication); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440
(1995) (Court, with Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissenting, upholds First Amendment
claim of Ku Klux Klan).
7. While the Court voted somewhat more frequently in favor of state government in
1994 than in 1992 and 1993, those years set the low-water mark for state civil success before
the High Court. Therefore, the 45% of all civil cases decided favorably to the states in
1994, while more "conservative" than the outcomes in 1992 and 1993, is still more "liberal"
than the outcome recorded during any other year since the inception of this Study.
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As a result, when the data on Tables 1 through 10 is viewed as a
whole, it suggests that the Rehnquist Court may have reached its con-
servative high-water mark. The present Court, which now includes
two members named by President Clinton,8 is rejecting numerous as-
sertions of federal (and state) regulatory power. The Court, further-
more, is increasingly sensitive to First Amendment and statutory civil
rights claims. Moreover, and in contrast to the prior two terms, the
Court is mbre willing to exercise its jurisdiction. Any conservative
movement by the Court is exceptionally weak. In short, and in com-
parison to the 1993 Term, the balance of power on the Court is be-
coming more liberal.9
The other matters of note generated by this year's Study are set
out in Section IV, which includes various regression analyses of the
data collected for this Study. The data demonstrates that while there
has been only minor statistically significant ideological movements
this term, the data generated over the lifetime of this Study has been
rather accurate and (at least as to the voting patterns of individual
Justices) may have some predictive value. Section IV also demon-
strates that, over time, certain Justices do tend to vote together in var-
ious categories of cases. Justice Kennedy, for example, tends to vote
in state civil cases with both the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor.
Although subject to important caveats, this statistical result suggests
that a state attorney general arguing a civil case could benefit by pay-
ing special consideration to the views of those three Justices.
H. Mode of Analysis
Our analysis is drawn from a tabulation of each Justice's votes in
ten categories of cases. Nine of the categories are based on the nature
of the issues (i.e., First Amendment, equal protection, etc.) or on the
character of the parties (i.e., state or federal government litigants). 10
8. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.
9. The outcome on Table 10 perhaps demonstrates this best. While cases decided by
a conservative five-member bloc may have generated significant media attention, the fact
remains that the great majority of five-to-four decisions were rendered by a liberal, not a
conservative, coalition.
10. The categories are as follows:
1) Civil controversies in which a state, or one of its officials or political subdivisions, is
opposed by a private party.
2) Civil controversies in which the federal government, or one of its agencies or offi-
cials, is opposed by a private party.
3) State criminal cases.
4) Federal criminal cases.
5) First Amendment issues of freedom of speech, press, and association.
[rVol. 23:1
The tenth category tabulates the number of times each Justice voted
with the majority in cases decided by a single, or "swing," vote.
These categories are designed to demonstrate each Justice's atti-
tude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court deci-
sion- making-individual rights and judicial restraint. The tabulation
of votes in each category demonstrates, in admittedly broad strokes,
the frequency with which individual Justices and the Court as a whole
vote to protect individual rights"' or exercise judicial restraint.' 2
From the voting patterns that emerge, we attempt to determine
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking "conservative" or
"liberal" positions.'3 For the purposes of this Study, we classify as
conservative a vote favoring the government against an individual, a
vote against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against
6) Equal protection issues.
7) Statutory civil rights claims.
8) Issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, and related
matters.
9) Federalism issues.
11. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome of
state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the
resolution of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause
(Table 6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Tables 1 and 2 also
involve individual rights, since these suits pit the government against persons asserting
private rights. The federalism decisions outlined in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to
individual rights because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and state authority.
Nevertheless, in such cases, the practical effect of voting for the state is to deny federal
relief to a party alleging state encroachment upon his or her rights.
12. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the Jus-
tices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of judicial
restraint as opposed to judicial activism. Other Tables included in this Study, however,
also provide some indication of the individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the
"judicial restraint/judicial activism" axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with def-
erence to the policy-making branches of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance
of constitutional bases of decision when narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers'
intent when construing constitutional text, and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary
by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, political questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor
of individual rights claims (Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) may provide some indication of "judicial
activism" because judicial recognition of individual rights often requires the Court to over-
turn precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Federalism issues (Table 9) are also rele-
vant because judicial restraint is traditionally identified with respect for the role of the
states within the federal system.
13. We are mindful of the limited validity of the "conservative" and "liberal" labels.
As one noted federal jurist has commented:
All that I think can be justly said about the utility of applying overworked labels
to judges is that they are appropriate to some judges on some issues some of the
time. But to use them as generic descriptions characterizing judges on supposedly
major points of difference exaggerates the extent to which they may fairly apply.
FRANK M. CoFFrN, THm WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECrIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPEL-
LATE BENCH 201 (1980).
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the exercise of jurisdiction, or a vote favoring state, as opposed to
federal, authority on federalism questions. We classify as liberal all
contrary votes.
This analytical scheme, of course, is not perfect. Unanimous deci-
sions (a significant portion of all cases decided by the Court) are in-
cluded in this Study even though "liberal" or "conservative" ideology
may not have influenced the outcome of such cases.' 4 Furthermore,
concern for individual rights is not always (or even necessarily) the
attitudinal opposite of judicial restraint. 15 In other cases, particular
circumstances may create a reversal in the expected relationship. For
example, liberals may vote against and conservatives in favor of a
claim of individual rights. Such events may have occurred several
times this term. 6
Nevertheless, the basic assumption that supports this Study-that
the general orientation of individual Justices and the Court to individ-
ual rights and judicial restraint is suggestive of liberal or conservative
ideology-appears generally sound.17 To the extent that this assump-
tion accurately reflects the proposed ideological tendencies, one can
identify trends by tracking the votes reflected in Tables 1 through 10.
To reconcile ideological positions within the Court, the individual
votes cast can be readily compared with those of other Justices for any
given year. Determination of the current ideological position of the
14. When an opinion is issued by a unanimous Court, it is often true that either the
law or the facts, or both, pointed so clearly in one direction that ideology was not a deci-
sional factor.
15. For example, if existing precedent grants extensive protection to individual rights,
a Justice who resists efforts to undermine that precedent (a "conservative" trait) is exercis-
ing restraint and also acting to preserve individual rights (a "liberal" result).
16. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (politically
conservative coalition comprised of Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and the
Chief Justice voted in favor of an equal protection claim in a "reverse" discrimination case,
while the traditional "liberals"-Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer-vote in
favor of the government, a "conservative" outcome); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (a politically conservative coalition votes in favor
of the First Amendment claim brought by a campus religious group, while the "liberal"
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer vote against the claimed violation of individ-
ual rights); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia,
Thomas, and the Chief Justice voted in favor of an equal protection claim in a challenge to
the racial composition of a voting district, while the Court's "liberals" cast "conservative"
votes supporting the challenged governmental action.).
17. Deference to legislatures frequently means rejection of an individual's claim, espe-
cially one predicated upon the impropriety of governmental action. Emphasis upon the
Framers' intent is often associated with a reluctance to read new individual rights into the
Constitution. Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the matter to state courts with
their possible bias in favor of actions by state governments, and is a clear rebuff to the
claimant seeking federal vindication of rights.
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Court as a whole, however, requires comparisons over time. For our
analysis, the best available baseline is the comparable data generated
for the six prior Terms.18 In the tables, this information appears in the
form of percentages for the Court majority and for each Justice in all
but the Swing-Vote Table (Table 10). Figures 1 through 10 graphically
demonstrate the voting trends revealed by the tables.
We have also included several regression analyses for the five Jus-
tices who have been on the Court since 1987-Justices Scalia,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Stevens, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. The re-
maining four Justices have not been on the Court long enough for us
to perform a reliable regression analysis. The goal of Section IV is to
test whether any ideological movement this Term by the five longest
tenured Justices is statistically significant. In addition, Section IV sets
out predicted voting patterns for the upcoming 1995 Term, and identi-
fies several possible voting blocs within the ten categories analyzed in
this Study. Among other things, this analysis demonstrates that, over
time, certain Justices have indeed tended to vote together in various
categories of cases.
However, our data must be interpreted with caution since the
percentages on each table are affected not only by the behavior of the
individual Justices, but also by the factual and legal nature of the cases
decided in a given term. Although our various regression tests are
designed to increase the reliability of this Study, statistics remain a
blunt analytical tool for probing the mysteries of a process as delicate
as judicial decisionmaking. One cannot be confident that percentage
changes from term to term reflect changes in the ideological orienta-
tion of an individual Justice or the Court majority.' 9
Moreover, while Section IV demonstrates that there are correla-
tions in the voting behavior of individual Justices, such correlations do
not demonstrate causation. The fact that the Chief Justice and Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor tend to vote together in state civil cases sim-
ply does not demonstrate that the Chief Justice's vote somehow influ-
ences the vote of Justice Kennedy or O'Connor. In short, in
18. We use six years of data primarily to facilitate compilation of the Tables. Because
of changes in Court personnel over time, including more than six prior Terms on Tables 1-
10 becomes somewhat cumbersome. Comparative analysis of a given Term with six prior
Terms, furthermore, is adequate to gauge any ideological fluctuations on the Court.
19. A vote to uphold a greater percentage of criminal convictions than in a previous
Term may mean that the Justice or the Court has become tougher on criminal defendants.
Alternatively, it may mean only that in this Term, the facts or the law (or both) of a
number of individual cases were less favorable to the defendant than in previous years. The
same is true of other categories of cases.
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evaluating these findings, one must continually keep in mind the limi-
tations inherent in any attempt to empirically analyze a subjective
process.20
Im. The Voting Record
We turn now to a detailed examination of the voting behavior of
the individual Justices and the Court. As an initial matter, it should be
noted that the Court majority vote was very middle-of-the-road in
1994. With the exception of Table 5 (First Amendment Rights) and
Table 6 (Equal Protection), which reflects only three total cases, the
Court's majority score never ranged below 40% nor above 60%. This
outcome, while within predicted statistical values based on prior
years' data,2 1 does come as a bit of a surprise considering the suppos-
edly conservative makeup of the Court. This year's data suggests that
the Rehnquist Court is moderating its course and moving toward a
more centrist position.
20. At this point, one could ask whether this Study-because of its inherent limita-
tions-is worth either conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years, experienced
Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to "psyche out" the ideological predilections
of individual Justices in framing their arguments to the Court. Moreover, the media (as
well as academicians of all stripes) are rather fond of attaching ideological labels to the
Court and its personnel. Supreme Court practitioners, legal scholars and the public, there-
fore, have long assumed that an assessment of Court ideology is valuable-even though
such assessments have often been based upon little more than the "gut reactions" of the
attorneys, scholars and news reporters involved. This Study, based as it is upon a system-
atic attempt to objectively gather, quantify and compare data over time, should be some-
what more reliable than such ad hoc assessments.
21. See infra Section IV, Regression Tables 1-10.
[Vol. 23:1
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
I O.0. , ,o .o 0n C,\
,- CC\OOI D -\O\0 '.0 tn0
I n C q 'n.4: q 0
C\ 4 9 C, . . . . d*u
° i.i r4 r4 %D •
I d-~- I ,-It
0I0IooI~-4~4I 4=
101 I I I II I i0I0
>0 0  C -t- - 1 1v4 -
o 100 O0 oo r-
Fall 1995]
. . . . . . . . . .
1-1 cn
%6 cli
,Tn I cmn
o6 c ui 6
1-4 v-4 r- -4
10 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:1
00I-
i\  0
I
0.0
00
* ~00
k4 0I '!
_ 0%Aw 10 n ST m N
JLNNANHgAOD HIOA SMI OA %
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
I I '. c
Stn r
I0 t": '. r-0
in 1 0 \0 %011
-4 c C* 1- enr-
ci q InI nc
,I- I 1-d' P I %DI
e~e~----4- o
%.0
0 A 1-4 -- -
0 0\ 1 o 00 t
:3 & u U
U t:
>o J A od_
0
. . . . . . . . . .
Fall 19951
r-. i,,ol
en 010\ I oq Cq
c\-4= 00 00
-n C-D
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAl
i I _IT
o , \ 00 ' '0 , %J e -
1N WN~I3AOD UIO& SflOA %
, LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:1
CA
0\
0\
ol
0
0
00
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
tn [- -4oo"1 orow j~io
I 0t- 0
V-i~C11 \0 L- C.
t- \0 • 000 Cf 0Sin \0 \0 .• %0
t
"
q\ r ,: q '-4 cl t--: q oq ci %q V
r--0. 0.
cnin i
tc1
0 00. o
0
~l 0 El~
C~ utC CIS
Fall 1995]
00
cn
0\
0\ 9 r- -q -4 CD 00
1:1 1 "1 1 - I ID00 c* 00 tn \.o
cn0\ ci q ci cn
un w -q -1 -4
r- tn "1, 11, 1'*cn 1,:, 1 cf, I i1i I 'i I 'i I
.ef-4
HASTINGS CONST]TUTIONAL LAW
I I I L ~. I I I T I"
QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:1
0 M 00 r 0 0 0 00 0
.NANNa:I[AOf HTOI SaIOA %
Fall 1995] - SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR 15
,, , 0o0 00 %D "0
t" O-4 D 00
00 j 00 00 : j i 00 0 0
r- K. 1.0 \0 0c
'D tn CD 40 4=C0 i
0 0 -q-0 00 o '0 '0 m . 'r
V>0I.
a, O0
0 6 M3
uo Or lo -8 7E!
c-
Fall 19951
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR 15
00 100 1 - I "
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
4 ,
0000000
1MNHJNTAO9 HIOA SHIOA %
00000
. i i i i i i
[Vol. 23:1
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
IoO I o
C7%~r~ rn %0 4=0 C
"t tn'r I c ' C1 0
In In Ci
-4--f
r- r- t n r q o
, I " ,I.'o,
-I cq~zi IFIEPHmcn-d-.d
0Oo0.6
Oo
Fall 19951
40 r-:
tri .4
cq 1 %0
C% -
°- °
rq.,n
COi,m, 1o 0 0
18 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:1
~0'
- I
A)1
C)
// /
/ 0'
iCo 00
00
0 C> C> C> 0 a 0 0 0 0 0
WMJ"I SlHf)I HOA SHIOA %
FaIl 19951 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
. -0 tc 0
e~ o ii c o- 000¢ e
'o 0 5 d 5 c
0, tt 0 C t t
cq N cq N C) (0 dl * 0 c~ C1 IIft 0*.0 0 c
<Den~e~ 0 0n 00
000 jn jn 0n\ 0 0n in i
R~~g q Rqq qqqc
v-4 -4 1- 4IfN- -
u
e I=
-~ 4-4--4-~-~-+-4--4-~-4-+-4--
u
z
o0
Fall 19951 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
20 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:1
CA
cc
0/
/
/
inL
00 C
\0
U
JD ) > C0 Q 0 0 0 0 )
MV '1J SJLH ) - ROI SMIOA %
Fall 1995] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
I; 
_____
OO0..4 'Dq lc. I C!V:-i i i
I IoO\ It In l
q ii Ci Cit: i Ci
'-4 In II n 0 t D
C% 0D 00It ninC% I5 I %6 wi tf C
0, 09 0n 0 0 0 =
R 0 0 0 0
0
0 0
D CD
66: IR
> z
-4,q T-4 -4 Cq r-4 r-
V4 0 : 0 u
0
C/3
Fall 19951 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
q', I0
M cn 'nNt Nt In Ci Ci Ci Ci Ci
22 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
0 00 0 0 0> 0 >0 0 0 0
PdID SIHOIH U0O± SalOA %
[Vol. 23:1
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
ON 00 1 1 1 "tc D C d
'n c In C R l C
00 -4 C r en 00 00O~O " t "It IIn tn \O M 00
q0l n c eI'l-I q- cn
* I . I . .R .I '
z0
0
0
0o 100 100 1t-
clO
4) 0
.- 0
Fall 19951
N N N te "'T ' , I* N
L----L-
24 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:1
ON
'I,
0n
lel
0%
/ -
I'a
|u
00
00 0
000
I 0 N
-\U,
-i,
*
OD 0 CU 0 a 0 0 p 0 SD a
MOLLJIGSIltflf HOA SHIOA %
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
M f M cfi 0io O
in t X " I'l 'C'4 t 0
N--- 00 r- cooun
%0 Mtn % N11 10 10 0
010
M tn tn w w c 1: r , 010 0 \ " 00 r- 1.411 22q 1
t%
II 0
II ~ aIIVs J9 - .0 . G ~ *
0uQ
__14 r. ~ _
-,cn
Fall 19951
en'g
2 1 m I c", 112 1 r:,Il 11:4 1 a,1 .0 1 t-
c\
IN ci In In In q Nt OqCq N tn tn in C "zr Win tn tn in "t M
26 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:1
0N
ON
0
C\ A
00
I,' 0'
0
00
P. .\
/ 0)
ON!
wiD G\ I 0 O1 t-OA % 
VD MIVIS IIOA SUJLOA %
FaIl 19951 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
0oo
'-f F
14 r %0 %0 w o 1 0 I 1 1
rt: Oq Ci I Nt' N oq
-d W -- n 0 C1 4 0
w ~ ~ ~ ~ c tnId nN 0
r- I 0\e
cq <D cq -l-q en %0t- 11, - w r- %0
CIO
0
z
CD
.00
0
0
,
c tn \0r-co00c00a00 0\ CDCt
S100 100 100
co
00
o
d)
0
,0
00FqID q= 4=00 e rl-
Fall 19951 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
C', I "r,
-411 -4
28 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY fVol. 23:1
\-~
N
II
II
\ - -
0\
- 0
,, ll0
InUOfVW RUM S3IOA %
B. Analysis
Table 1: Civil-State Party
Table 122 and Figure 1 both show a slight increase in support for
state civil cases. Both the Majority All Cases and Unanimous catego-
ries rose slightly in 1994 from 40.91% to 45% and from 33.33% to
44.44% respectively. There was a small decrease in the number of
decisions decided in favor of state governments in the Split Decision
category (46.15% to 45.45%), but the decrease is so small that it
seems insignificant. Consequently, in the aggregate, support for state
governments in civil cases has increased marginally, ending what was a
constant, but gradual decline since 1990.
On an individual basis, Chief Justice Rehnquist remains the most
conservative Justice in civil cases involving state governments. In
1994, he voted in favor of state governments 60% of the time. This
score is an 8.18 point decrease from 1993, however, and is lower than
any of his previous terms except 1992. In addition, Justice Scalia
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist for the top position, increasing his sup-
port for state governments from 50% in 1993 to 60% in 1994. This
increase, however, is also lower than in the past years of 1989, 1990,
and 1991, in which Justice Scalia's scores were all 64% or more.
Justice Souter made the greatest change in position among the
Justices, moving from a third-place tie with Justice Thomas in 1993
22. Cases decided in favor of state government:
Nebraska Dept. of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 115 S. Ct. 557 (1994)
Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291 (1995)
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995)
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S.
Ct. 1671 (1995)
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995)
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995)
National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351 (1995)
Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995)
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
Cases decided against state government:
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994)
Reich v. Collins, 115 S. Ct. 547 (1994)
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995)
Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1203 (1995)
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995)
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995)
City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div. Nat. Gypsum Co., 115 S. Ct. 2091 (1995)
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995)
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995)
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995)
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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(45.45%), to last place in 1994 (35%). This change of position, how-
ever, occurred with only a 10.45 point decrease in supporting votes.
As a result, Justice Souter's five-position drop took place not only be-
cause he voted fewer times in favor of state governments, but also
because the number of votes dividing all the Justices decreased dra-
matically in 1994. The maximum number of votes in favor of state
governments in 1994 was 12 (scored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia), while the minimum number was 7 (scored by Justice
Souter). This five-vote spread is almost half of what it was in 199323
and 19924 when the spread was nine votes. Thus, any changes in po-
sitions by the Justices may not be as dramatic as a simple reading of
Table I might suggest. Nevertheless, Justice Souter's 1994 voting per-
centage (35%) is his lowest since joining the Court in 1990.
Also noteworthy is the apparent shift in state support that Justice
O'Connor has demonstrated since 1990. In 1990, she voted in favor of
the states 68% of the time, a score 8% higher than the Chief Justice's
current-and "top of the chart"-1994 score. By contrast, in 1994
Justice O'Connor voted in favor of state governments a mere 40% of
the time. This is her lowest voting percentage in this category since
the inception of this Study. Is it possible that Justice O'Connor, a for-
mer state legislator and judge,1 is growing less receptive to arguments
propounded by state governments the longer she sits on the High
Court?26
Counter to Justice O'Connor's steady decline in support of the
states, Justice Stevens made a 14.84 point increase in support in
1994.27 In 1993, he voted in favor of the states only 27.27% of the
time, the lowest percentage of support given to the states by any of
the listed Justices since 1988. In 1994, however, he increased his sup-
port to 42.11%, his highest level of support ever recorded by this
Study.
23. See Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, supra note 4.
24. See Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1992 Term, 8
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 229 (1994).
25. STEVEN G. O'BRIEN, AMERICAN POLmCAL LEADERS 307 (Paula McGuire ed.,
1991).
26. Compare supra Table 2 (Justice O'Connor, of all members of the current Court,
casts the least number of votes in favor of the federal government in civil cases in 1994).
Justice O'Connor's state and federal civil votes this Term may not demonstrate any grow-
ing antipathy for state government per se, but rather growing wariness of government
(state or federal) in general.
27. Justice Stevens abstained from voting in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995). Thus, he confronted one less case than did the
majority in Table 1.
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Finally, Justice Breyer, who replaced Justice Blackmun in 1994,
voted only three-quarters of a percentage point below Justice Black-
mun's 1993 percentage of 42.86%. 28 Justice Breyer's 42.11 voting per-
centage in favor of state governments in 1994 shows that Justice
Breyer seems to have picked up right where Justice Blackmun left off.
Table 2: Civil-Federal Party
Table 229 and Figure 2 suggest that the Court is increasingly less
supportive of federal government claims. From 81% support in 1990,
the Court's votes in favor of the federal government in the Majority
All Cases category have consistently decreased-down to a mere
42.11% in 1994. In the Split Decision category, Court support has
dropped from a high of 83.30% in 1991 to 33.33%. These figures are
below the results recorded in any previous term analyzed in this
Study.
This decrease may be attributed partially to the Court's reaction
to ordinary politics. Where in 1991, a Republican Administration
brought claims to what was considered a fairly conservative Court, in
1994 a Democratic Administration brought different claims before a
substantially identical Court. It could be that the Court was more
sympathetic to the federal government's claims in 1991 because these
claims were more agreeable to a conservative Court's principles of
28. Justice Breyer abstained from voting in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock, 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995).
29. Cases decided in favor of the federal government:
ICC v. Transcon Lines, 115 S. Ct. 689 (1995)
NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995)
Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115 S. Ct. 1232 (1995)
Shalala v. Whitecotton, 115 S. Ct. 1477 (1995)
Stone v. INS, 115 S. Ct. 1537 (1995)
Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 115 S. Ct. 2144 (1995)
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995)
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995)
United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
Cases decided against the federal government:
Federal Elections Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994)
Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552 (1994)
Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995)
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995)
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995)
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995)
United States v. Williams, 115 S. Ct. 1611 (1995)
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995)
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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adjudication. By contrast, the Court is less sympathetic to claims
brought by an ideologically polarized Executive Branch.
The above hypothesis also seems to explain the voting patterns
evidenced by certain individual Justices. At the top of Table 2 is Jus-
tice Stevens. In 1994, he voted in favor of the federal government
68.42%. In 1993, his support of the federal government was almost
equally strong as he took the second position on Table 2, voting
70.59% of the time in favor of the United States. These two scores,
rendered during terms when a purportedly liberal President occupied
the White House, are nearly thirty-five percentage points above his
1992 score and more than ten percentage points above any previous
year in this Study (years, of course, when conservatives held the Exec-
utive reins). Based on these figures, it is at least plausible that when
the Executive Branch changed course in 1992, so did the issues raised
by the federal government and, subsequently, the support of Justice
Stevens.
Chief Justice Rehnquist showed similar behavior, albeit in the op-
posite direction. Before 1993, his support for the federal government
never dipped below 70%. In 1993, however, it decreased to 58.82%
and even further in 1994 to 52.63%. Such shifts are correlated to Jus-
tice Stevens' increases and suggest that the Chief Justice's approach to
adjudication is less supportive of the issues raised by the current
Administration.
Justice Scalia's voting pattern also parallels the gradual decline in
support of the federal government that the Court majority has shown
since 1991. In 1994, Justice Scalia voted in favor of the federal govern-
ment only 42.11%. This is his lowest mark in the Study and matches
those of Justices Souter and Thomas.
While Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justices Stevens' and Scalia's
voting habits seem rather inclined to rise and fall in accordance with
the ideologies of the reigning Executive Branch, Justices Souter's and
O'Connor's voting patterns are less predictable. This Term, Justice
Souter decreased his support for the federal government from 76.47%
in 1993 to 42.11%. This 34.36 percentage point drop is his lowest level
of federal support since joining the Court in 1990. In addition, this
drop is not gradual, but follows his high mark of 76.47%, a score that
gave him the highest 1993 voting percentage in favor of the federal
government.
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Justice O'Connor gave her lowest support ever to federal claims
in 1994.30 Voting only 27.78% in favor of federal claims, her score is
28.47 percentage points below her 1993 score of 56.25%. This decline
is also nearly twenty-five percentage points below her 1991 score of
52.4%, the lowest recorded support for federal claims previously re-
corded in this Study. It should be noted, however, that while her 1994
voting behavior shows a substantial decrease in support for federal
claims from previous years, it is not the first time she has been the
least supportive Justice. In 1991, Justice O'Connor also ranked last
place in support for federal claims. In fact, her 52.38% support for
federal claims in that year was 28.57 percentage points below the
Court's majority score of 80.95%.31 The remaining Justices made no
significant movement in 1994.32
Table 3: State Criminal Cases
Support for the states in criminal cases increased somewhat from
the 1993 to the 1994 Term.33 In 1994, the Court majority voted in
favor of the states 58.33%. That percentage, however, is not a signifi-
cant shift from last year's figure of 56.25%. Equally uneventful are
the scores in the Split Decision and Unanimous categories.34
30. Justice O'Connor abstained from voting on the Civil, Federal Party issue in Lebron
v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995). Thus, she addressed one less issue
than did the majority in Table 2.
31. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's decline in support for the federal government
between 1991 and 1994 is less dramatic than the overall decrease in support by the Court
majority. The majority's 42.11% support in 1994 is a drastic 39-point decline from the 81%
support it gave in 1991. By comparison, Justice O'Connor's support of the federal govern-
ment has declined only twenty-five percentage points since 1991.
32. Justice Ginsburg abstained from voting in Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Polit-
ical Victory Fund, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994).
33. Cases decided in favor of the state:
Duncan v. Henry, 115 S. Ct. 887 (1995)
Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995)
Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995)
Goeke v. Branch, 115 S. Ct. 1275 (1995)
California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S. Ct. 1597 (1995)
Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995)
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995)
Cases decided against the state:
Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995)
O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995)
Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995)
Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995)
Garlotte v. Fordice, 115 S. Ct. 1948 (1995).
34. Votes in favor of the state in split decisions dropped a mere 1.54 percentage points,
a score easily within the range of the past. In the Unanimous category, the Court increased
its voting percentage 16.67 points from 33.33% in 1993 to 50% in 1994. Considering, how-
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But, while the Court majority figures are rather mundane, the
voting pattern displayed by the individual Justices ranged all across
the spectrum, from Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, who
voted 91.67% of the time in favor of the states, to Justice Stevens, who
cast only 8.33% of his votes in favor of the states. Four Justices-
Rehnquist, Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy-voted in favor of the states
at least 75% of the time, while another four Justices-Breyer, Gins-
burg, Souter, and Stevens-cast fewer than 42% of their votes on be-
half of the state. In the middle, and mirroring the statistical outcome
of the Majority All Cases category, lies Justice O'Connor who voted
for the states 58.33% of the time.
In the area of state criminal cases, this breakdown suggests that
the Court is fairly evenly divided. Four Justices voted consistently in
favor of the states, while four voted consistently against. One or the
other of these wings was decisive, depending upon how Justice
O'Connor cast her fifth vote. Indeed, Table 3 suggests that the out-
come of state criminal cases was heavily influenced by Justice
O'Connor's swing vote.'
Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases
Paralleling the decline in its support of federal civil claims, Table
436 and Figure 4 demonstrate a continuing decline in the Court's over-
all support for the federal government in criminal cases. As with the
civil cases, this trend began after the 1991 Term. Since that term, the
Court majority has decreased its support of the federal government in
criminal cases from 69.20% to 53.85% in 1994. At no other time since
ever, the two unanimous cases in this category in 1994, and the variance in previous terms,
the 1994 result suggests no notable changes.
35. In the State Criminal Cases category, there were three swing-vote decisions. Jus-
tice O'Connor was the deciding vote in all three. See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995);
Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995); Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
36. Cases decided in favor of the federal government:
United States v. Shabani, 115 S. Ct. 382 (1994)
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994)
United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995)
United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995)
Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995)
Reno v. Koray, 115 S. Ct. 2021 (1995).
Cases decided against the federal government:
Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995)
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)
Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995)
Ryder v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2031 (1995)
United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995)
United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995).
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this Study began has the Court's support for the federal government
in criminal cases dipped below 60%. 37
On an individual basis, after his first year, Justice Breyer tied with
Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist for the spot most sup-
portive of the federal government. These three Justices voted in favor
of the government in 69.23% of criminal issues in 1994. Behind those
Justices, by only one vote, are Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter,
and Thomas, who all favored the federal government 61.54% of the
time in 1994. With a score of 53.85%, Justice Scalia ranks second to
last on Table 4 in 1994. Justice Stevens anchors the table with a score
23.08 percentage points below Justice Scalia. Justice Stevens was the
only Justice who voted in favor of the federal government less than
50% of the time.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor seem to be the
only members of the Court who made significant shifts from 1993 to
1994. Both voted less for the federal government than during any pre-
vious year of this Study. However, these declines were less than two
percentage points below their scores in 1990 and, therefore, may not
be noteworthy.
Table 5: First Amendmer
Table 538 and Figure 5 appear to signal a significant liberal shift in
favor of First Amendment claims. Overall, the Court embraced these
claims 77.78% of the time, more often than in any previous term ana-
lyzed in this Study. In fact, the Court's receptivity increased 20 per-
centage points from 1993, and more than doubled in the Split
Decisions category.
Moreover, from 1993 to 1994, a significant liberal movement is
evidenced by the individual voting patterns of six Justices. Justice
Kennedy jumped 17.46 percentage points, from the middle of the
37. For example, the Court majority's 1994 score is 12.82 percentage points below its
1993 score of 66.67% and nearly fifteen percentage points below its 1992 score of 68.75%.
38. Cases decided in favor of First Amendment claim:
Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995)
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995)
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995)
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995)
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995)
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995)
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
Cases decided against the First Amendment claim:
United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995)
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
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chart, to take first place as the Justice most receptive of First Amend-
ment claims, voting for the claim in 88.89% of cases. Similarly, Justice
Souter catapulted from near last place to second. His shift from
57.14% to 77.78% mirrored exactly the Court's 20.64% upward leap.
Even the Chief Justice, who, for the last three terms, has stood as the
Court's most conservative Justice with regard to First Amendment
claims, embraced such claims in over half of the cases presented, up
12.70 percentage points. 39 Furthermore, there is not much difference
in the statistics of the individual Justices. Indeed, five members of the
Court-both politically conservative and liberal-voted for the claim
in 66.67% of cases.
But, despite the above statistics, it may be too soon to announce a
new dawning of liberal First Amendment ideology. Notwithstanding
the apparent First Amendment uniformity this term,40 great differ-
ences exist in the Justices' individual motivations. Indeed, the liberal
movement noted in 1994 may have resulted from political interplay
between the ideological camps on the Court. The Court's disposition
of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia 41 and
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette42 demonstrate
this possibility. In both, the Justices evinced interesting ideological
role reversals. In Rosenberger, a five-to-four majority composed of
the Court's most politically conservative members43 sustained a free-
dom of speech claim raised by students who wished to publish with
University funds an avowedly Christian journal. Similarly, in Capitol
Square, a seven-to-two majority, anchored by these same Justices, ac-
cepted a First Amendment claim by the Ku Klux Klan, overturning an
injunction barring the Klan from displaying a cross in a public square
adjacent to Ohio's state capitol building. Two of the Court's most po-
39. Only Justices Scalia, Thomas and Ginsburg voted less frequently in favor of First
Amendment claims.
40. The Court unanimously accepted the First Amendment claims in Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995), and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bi-
sexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995), and nearly unanimously in Lebron v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995). Only Justice O'Connor dissented in Lebron. For
jurisdictional reasons, she confined her analysis of the case to a much narrower question
than did the majority. Because Lebron had conceded in a lower court that Amtrak was not
a governmental entity and because that question was not presented in Lebron's petition for
certiorari, Justice O'Connor restricted her analysis to "[w]hether the alleged suppression of
Lebron's speech by Amtrak, as a concededly private entity, should be imputed to the Gov-
ernment." Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 975. United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995), was
decided unanimously against the claim.
41. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
42. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
43. The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas.
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litically liberal Justices-Stevens and Ginsburg-were the only
dissenters.
Last Term, there were similar role reversals in which politically
conservative majorities effected liberal results by espousing First
Amendment claims.' We explained this phenomenon by noting a re-
alignment in conservative and liberal poles on the Court in reaction to
the liberal agenda asserted by the federal government under President
Clinton.4 5 This Term, although the Court's reaction does not appear
to flow from the litigating posture of the federal government, the
same ideological role reversal is apparent. In 1994, the politically lib-
eral Justices tended to vote in favor of the government, while the po-
litically conservative Justices adopted liberal, antigovernment
stances-e.g., in favor of the Virginia students and the Ku Klux Klan.
Indeed, Rosenberger and Capitol Square, along with one case decided
unanimously against the First Amendment claim, United States v.
Aguilar,46 explain all three conservative votes of Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg.
But despite this, the liberal movement in the First Amendment
arena this term cannot be discounted entirely or attributed simply to
the political reorientation of the Court. Unlike last Term, when the
traditionally liberal Justices generally voted against First Amendment
claims, there were a number of cases this Term in which political liber-
als voted in favor of First Amendment claims, as they traditionally
have done. Indeed, once beyond the role reversal and unanimous (or
near unanimous) decisions, it was the historically liberal Justices, not
the politically conservative members of the Court, who embraced the
First Amendment claims in the three remaining cases.47 This factor
44. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun
rejected the claim that the First Amendment required strict scrutiny of provisions for cable
television); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined by Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg struck down several pro-
visions of an injunction limiting antiabortion protests).
45. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, supra note 4, at 294-97.
46. 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995).
47. E.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995)
(Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer and O'Connor sustained First
Amendment challenge to the Ethics in Government Act; the Chief Justice and Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissented); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995)
(Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer sustained First
Amendment challenge to Ohio elections law; the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia dis-
sented). Cf. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (five-to-four decision
rejecting First Amendment claim, with Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg
voting in favor of the First Amendment argument).
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validates, at least to some degree, the apparent liberal shift of the
Court this term.4 8
Table 6: Equal Protection
Table 649 and Figure 6 afford little data that is useful for statistical
analysis. Last Term, the Court considered only one case involving an
equal protection claim. This Term, the Court considered three. This
is an exceptionally small sample from which to draw any statistical
conclusion. The equal protection cases, however, will undoubtedly
provide ample fodder for the more traditional legal analysis.
In each of the equal protection cases this Term, the same five-
member majority held sway. In Missouri v. Jenkins,5 0 Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas voted
against the claim and in favor of the State in a school desegregation
action. However, this same politically conservative coalition reached
liberal results by voting in favor of equal protection claims in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peia51 and Miller v. Johnson.52 Responding to
Adarand's challenge against the federal government's subcontractor
compensation program, which offered financial incentives to govern-
mental contractors hiring minority owned subcontractors, the Court
held that all governmental classifications based on race are subject to
strict judicial scrutiny. Similarly, the Court in Miller held that Geor-
gia's congressional redistricting plan violated equal protection princi-
ples because the state focused solely on the race of the prospective
constituents in redrawing the lines of three majority-minority districts.
These results, like the First Amendment cases discussed above,
may be the result of a political reorientation on the Court. A politi-
cally conservative coalition voted against the equal protection claim
when it required continuing supervision of a school desegregation pro-
gram, but sustained the claim when the equal protection clause was
48. It also explains the drastic drop in receptivity by Justices Scalia and Thomas, both
of whom fell from first place in 1993, where they voted in favor of the claim 85.71% of the
time. This Term, Justice Scalia voted for the claim 55.56% of the time, dropping over thirty
percentage points to join the Chief Justice in last place. Justice Thomas accepted the claim
in only 66.67% of the cases.
49. Cases decided in favor of the equal protection claim:
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
Case decided against the equal protection claim:
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
50. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
51. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
52. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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invoked to curtail the explicit use of racial classifications as a remedial
tool. The politically liberal Justices took the opposite tack. This ex-
planation may account for the unusually conservative showing of Jus-
tice Stevens, who traditionally has favored equal protection claims, as
well as the liberal voting records of the Chief Justice and Justices
O'Connor and Scalia who historically have been reluctant to embrace
such claims.
In light of the foregoing explanation, one could ask whether the
terms "liberal" and "conservative," as used in this Study, reflect real-
ity-inasmuch as Table 6 suggests that the Chief Justice and Justice
Scalia are significantly more "liberal" than Justice Stevens. We can
only answer that the ideological labels used here do not hold the same
connotations attributed to those terms by ordinary politics. In this
Study, "liberal" votes are those cast to invalidate a challenged asser-
tion of government power, while "conservative" votes are cast to sus-
tain the disputed regulation. While this classification scheme may
produce the apparent anomaly of a "conservative" Justice Stevens, it
is nevertheless true that in 1994 Justice Stevens was twice as support-
ive of assertions of government regulatory power in the equal protec-
tion arena as Justice Scalia. We will leave it to legal philosophers and
other pundits to debate which is the truly conservative or liberal
position.
Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights
Table 753 and Figure 7 at first glance appear to evince significant
liberal movement in the Court's acceptance of civil rights claims. The
Court accepted half of all claims presented to it this Term, whereas
last Term it accepted only a third. Additionally, five of the nine Jus-
tices significantly increased their individual receptivity to these claims:
Justices Stevens increased his vote 19.44 percentage points while Jus-
tices Ginsburg and Souter each increased their votes 30.56 percentage
points to vote for the claim 75% of the time, joining Justice Breyer,
the Court's newest member, at the top of the chart. Also, the Chief
Justice and Justice O'Connor each voted for the claim in 50% of the
cases, an increase of 16.67 percentage points from last term.
53. Cases decided in favor of statutory civil rights claims:
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995)
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995).
Cases decided against statutory civil rights:
National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351 (1995)
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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However, the magnitude of this shift may be deceiving because
only four cases proffered statutory civil rights claims, two of which
were decided unanimously.54 Of the two remaining cases, only one
was resolved in favor of the claim. In City of Edmonds v. Oxford
House, Inc.,55 the Court sustained a challenge under the Fair Housing
Act against municipal limitations on the number of unrelated persons
permitted to live in one dwelling unit. Conversely, Miller v. John-
son,56 discussed in Table 6 above, involved Georgia's hotly contested
congressional redistricting plan and a claim of voter's rights. In Miller,
a majority comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ken-
nedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas voted against the claim. With
such a small statistical universe, it is difficult to draw any fixed conclu-
sions from Table 7.
Table 8 Jurisdiction
Table 817 and Figure 8 reveal a slight liberal shift in the overall
acceptance of claims asserting the Court's jurisdiction. From the 1993
Term, receptivity has increased 6.67 percentage points in the Majority
All Cases category to 44.44% in 1994. In the Split Decisions category,
54. The Court decided McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879
(1995), unanimously for the claim, and National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351 (1995), unanimously against the claim.
55. 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995).
56. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
57. Cases decided in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction:
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994)
Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995)
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995)
Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995)
Garlotte v. Fordice, 115 S. Ct. 1948 (1995)
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995)
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995).
Cases decided against the exercise of jurisdiction:
Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994)
NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995)
Duncan v. Henry, 115 S. Ct. 887 (1995)
Swint v. Chambers Cy. Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1203 (1995)
Director, Office of Workers' Comp. v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 115
S. Ct. 1278 (1995)
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1493 (1995)
Stone v. INS, 115 S. Ct. 1537 (1995)
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 115 S. Ct. 2137 (1995)
Johnson v. Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151 (1995)
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. MIV Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995)
United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995)
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
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the Court embraced 21.22% more claims than in 1993. Four Justices
appreciably increased their votes in favor of exercising jurisdiction-
Justice O'Connor by 17.78 percentage points, Justice Scalia by 12.78
percentage points, the Chief Justice by 7.78 percentage points, and
Justice Kennedy by 6.67 percentage points. Justice O'Connor in par-
ticular soared from last place on the chart to first, joining Justice Ken-
nedy, who climbed from third place, and Justice Stevens.
This movement, however, may be insignificant when viewed in
light of the Court's pre-1993 statistics. With the lone exception of
1993, this term's record appears significantly more conservative than
those of all previous terms. All nine Justices remained several per-
centage points below their next most conservative showings, and Jus-
tice Stevens, whose historic receptivity toward jurisdictional claims
remains unmatched by any other Justice currently on the Court, even
expanded his notably conservative showing from last term.5 8 Further-
more, of eight unanimous opinions, the Court issued only 25.00% in
favor of jurisdictional claims, down 15 percentage points from 1993.
Thus, the showing on Table 8 this Term appears to indicate merely
some moderation in the Court's generally conservative stance on juris-
dictional issues, rather than any general change of attitude.
Table 9: Federalism59
After deciding only seven federalism issues in 1993,60 eight less
than it decided in the 1992 Term,61 and 13 less than in the 1991 Term,62
the Court resumed a more active role in the area by deciding 18 cases
involving issues of federalism in 1994.63 As a majority, the Court
58. Justice Stevens abstained from voting in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995), Justice Ginsburg in Federal Election Comm'n
v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994), and Justice Breyer in Jerome B.
Grubart, 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995), and Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 115 S. Ct. 2137 (1995).
'Thus, these Justices addressed fewer issues than did the Court as a whole.
59. Because American Airlines v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995), had two federalism
issues, the federalism category contains eighteen votes total with only seventeen actual
cases.
60. See Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, supra note 4.
61. See Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1992 Term, supra note 24.
62. See Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1 (1992).
63. Cases decided in favor of the states:
Nebraska Dep't. of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 115 S. Ct. 557 (1994)
American Airlines v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995)
Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291 (1995)
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995)
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995)
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)
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voted in favor of the states 55.56%. This score is slightly less than the
Court majority's 57.14% score in 1993, but substantially higher than
its 26.09% score in 1991. Consequently, although the Court decided
several high profile cases in 1994 that could suggest that the Court is
highly sensitive to the balance of state power in the federalism area,64
its overall support for state governments, as opposed to the federal
government, was just slightly more than 50%.
In split decisions, the Court tended strongly toward the federal
government, voting only 36.36% of the time for the states. In unani-
mous decisions, however, the Court voted against the states only once
out of seven issues (or 85.71% in favor of the states). This suggests
that support for the states waned when the federalism issue was
controversial.
On an individual basis, Justice Scalia voted most often in favor of
the states in 1994.65 He reached 81.25%, his highest pro-state voting
percentage since the inception of this Study. This 1994 score is 24.11
percentage points higher than his 1993 score of 57.14% and a whop-
ping 55.16 percentage points higher than the 26.09% pro-state votes
he cast in 1991. But, while his 1994 score is his highest yet, no clear
trend is apparent for Justice Scalia, due to the volatility of his voting
pattern over the years.66
New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct.
1671 (1995)
North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 115 S. Ct. 1927 (1995)
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995)
National Private Truck Council Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351 (1995).
Cases decided in favor of the federal government:
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994)
American Airlines v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995)
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995)
Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995)
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995)
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995)
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 115 S. Ct. 1745 (1995)
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
64. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding Gun Free Zones Act
exceeds congressional power under the commerce clause); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jef-
ferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995) (holding Oklahoma sales tax does not violate the dor-
mant commerce clause).
65. Justice Scalia did not participate in American Airlines v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817
(1995), which resulted in two separate federalism issues. This explains why he voted on 16
federalism issues instead of the total 18.
66. While his 1992 and 1993 scores were rather stable (60% and 57.14%, respectively),
the outcome most years has varied by at least 20 percentage points. The 1989 Term
dropped to 56.3% from the 1988 figure of 76.2%. Even more pronounced was the drop
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The second most ardent supporters of states' rights are Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. In 1994, each voted in favor of
the states 72.22%. For Chief Justice Rehnquist, this score is over five
percentage points higher than his 1993 score of 71.43%. This score,
however, does not suggest any significant ideological movement for
the Chief Justice, considering his 1988 score of 81%. Conversely, Jus-
tice Thomas' support for states jumped 29.36 percentage points, in-
creasing from 42.86% in 1993. This jump is the most extreme made by
any Justice on the Court in 1994.
Tying for third place on Table 9 are Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
and Stevens. In 1994, they supported state government on just over
55% of the federalism issues. This percentage approximates the mid-
dle of the voting ranges evidenced by these Justices in the past and,
therefore, does not appear to suggest any ideological movement. Jus-
tice Ginsburg followed in fourth place with a 50% vote in favor of the
states, and Justice Souter was right behind with 44.44%.
Justice Breyer was the least supportive of states' rights in 1994.
This showing is unsurprising given his strong leadership in voting for
the federal government in criminal cases (Table 4). This seeming cor-
relation between Justice Breyer's voting in these two areas is not re-
flected, however, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's voting pattern.
Although he joined Justices Breyer and O'Connor at the top of Table
4, the Chief Justice largely rejected assertions of power by the federal
government over the states in federalism cases. Apparently, Justice
Breyer's motivations in federal criminal and federalism cases are
somewhat linked, while the Chief Justice's inclinations in these areas
are largely unrelated.
Table 10: Swing Votes
Table 1067 and Figure 10 reveal an interesting flip in the liberal
and conservative voting patterns of the different Justices. Whereas
between 1990 and 1991, when Justice Scalia lowered his support for the states from 71.4%
to 26.1%.
67. Swing-vote cases reaching a conservative outcome:
Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115 S. Ct. 1232 (1995)
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995)
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995)
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995)
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
Swing-vote cases reaching a liberal outcome:
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994)
Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995)
Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995)
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last term, five-member coalitions voted for conservative results in
64.29% of cases, coalitions this term favored liberal results by that
same proportion.68 This table measures the influence of each member
of the Court in effecting these conservative or liberal results. The Jus-
tice who most often votes with the majority in five-to-four cases wields
significant sway in shaping the disposition of the Court in the most
contentious issues.
As he did last term, Justice Kennedy tops the chart. Although he
dropped 11.61 percentage points from 1993, he voted with the major-
ity in 81.25% of close cases this term. Justice O'Connor was the next
most influential Justice, displacing the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia
in second place on the chart. She voted with the majority in 68.75%
of cases. Chief Justice Rehnquist slipped 8.93 percentage points to
third place, while Justice Scalia dropped 15.18 percentage points to
fourth place. Justices Ginsburg and Stevens each increased their
showings on this Term's table by voting 50% with Court majorities.
As in 1993, Justice Souter remains the Court's least influential Justice,
siding with the majority only 37.5% of the time.
Several occurrences make this Term's results particularly interest-
ing. First, as has been noted, the Court's traditionally conservative
members united in several of the most notable cases to effect, by lib-
eral votes against the exercise of government power, politically con-
servative ends. The same five Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995)
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995)
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995)
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
Swing-vote cases not classifiable as either conservative or liberal in outcome:
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995)
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
68. Two cases were not included in calculating the statistics in the Conservative and
Liberal Outcome categories: The results of Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1061
(1995), were not measurable by any of the previous nine tables, and thus not classifiable as
"liberal" or "conservative" per our definitions. Further, the Court in United States v. Lo-
pez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), declined to extend the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion to allow the federal government to proscribe carrying firearms in local school zones (a
liberal result) in favor of the states' police power (a conservative result in the federalism
table). These results proved mutually exclusive and were not included in the coalition
categories. They were, however, included in our calculus for the individual voting patterns
of the Justices. Compare Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995), in which the Court
voted for jurisdiction (a liberal result), but also voted for the government, for the state in a
federalism issue, and against an equal protection claim (all conservative claims). The re-
sults in this case were counted as a conservative outcome for purposes of Table 10.
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Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas-dominated the
Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia,69 Miller v. Johnson,7"
and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia.7 In
Adarand, the Court rejected the federal government's subcontractor
compensation program and held that all racial classifications, whether
benign or invidious, are subject to strict equal protection scrutiny.72
Likewise, in Miller, the Court held that Georgia violated equal protec-
tion principles by looking solely to the race of prospective constituents
in restructuring its congressional districts.73 The Rosenberger Court,
for its part, concluded that the University of Virginia curtailed certain
students' First Amendment right to freedom of speech by denying
them funds to publish a journal expressing a Christian viewpoint when
those funds were generally available to other student groups.74 In
each of these cases, the five-member majority voted against the gov-
ernment and in favor of claims for individual rights. This role rever-
sal-wherein politically conservative Justices vote for liberal results-
explains in part the relatively high number of "liberal" coalitions this
term, more than in any other term examined by this Study.75
Yet, in other cases which did not as readily attract media atten-
tion or scholarly comment as did the "big" cases just noted, the
Court's majorities voted according to the expected model of conserva-
tives voting for, and liberals against, the government.76 Furthermore,
review of these close but less politically charged cases reveals an inter-
esting chronological adjustment in the composition of the Court's ma-
jorities. Six cases confronted by the Court near the beginning of the
69. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
70. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
71. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
72. Adarand, 115 U.S. at 2117.
73. Miller, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4462, at *40.
74. Rosenberger, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4461, at *34.
75. But see Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115 S. Ct. 1232 (1995), in which
traditionally liberal Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, together with Justice Kennedy
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, voted conservatively in favor of the Health & Human Serv-
ices Secretary.
76. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (conservative coalition)
(dissenting Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Kennedy vote in favor of First Amend-
ment claim); Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (conservative coalition) (dissenting
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer conclude that prisoners have protected lib-
erty interests rejected by the majority); SchIup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995) (liberal coali-
tion) (rejecting government's argument that strict standards should be applied to
successive habeas corpus petitions); Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995) (liberal
coalition) (concluding that child's prior consistent out-of-court statements could not be
admitted on behalf of prosecution); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394
(1994) (liberal coalition) (rejecting immunity claim of state government).
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1994 Term were overwhelmingly decided by liberal majorities com-
posed primarily of Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, and
either Justice Kennedy or Justice O'Connor.77 Conversely, conserva-
tive majorities held sway in the four close cases confronted near the
end of the term.78 If (as is often assumed) the most troublesome cases
are decided near the end of the Court's term, it appears that conserva-
tive coalitions were having a rather difficult time coalescing this term.
This would indicate that, as noted at the outset of this Study, the
Rehnquist Court is becoming less rather than more conservative.
As in past terms, the Court remains polarized between its core
conservatives, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, and the equally intrepid liberal wing of Justices Stevens, Sou-
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Providing balance, however, are Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor, the Court's most moderate members. These
two Justices, though generally conservative in orientation, have
proved willing to lead the Court's decisionmaking in close cases. In
fact, Justice Kennedy anchored five-member coalitions in 13 of 16
swing vote cases, again positioning him as the Court's most influential
Justice. Justice O'Connor follows closely behind in second place.79
IV. Statistical Analyses
Using regression analysis, the voting patterns of the five Justices
analyzed in Tables 1-10 were tracked over an eight-year period."
77. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994) (liberal coalition-
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, Stevens); Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995)
(liberal coalition- Kennedy, Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg); Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct.
851 (1995) (liberal coalition-Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer); Kyles v.
Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995) (liberal coalition-Souter, Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg,
Breyer); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (liberal coalition-
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer); Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S.
Ct. 2227 (1995) (liberal coalition-Ginsburg, Breyer, Kennedy, Stevens, O'Connor).
78. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995) (conservative
coalition-Ginsburg, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct.
2038 (1995) (conservative coalition-Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas);
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (conservative coalition-Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (con-
servative coalition-O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Breyer).
79. Justice O'Connor, moreover, is particularly deft at leveraging her vote in these
close cases. Frequently, she sides only tenuously with five-member majorities, limiting the
precedential value of those opinions through concurrences full of caveats and limitations.
See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995); Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S.
Ct. 2227 (1995).
80. Specifically, from 1987 through 1994. We use eight years here, rather than the
seven Terms set out on Tables 1-10, to increase the reliability of this statistical analysis. See
infra notes 83-84.
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Three sets of statistical tests were performed on the data. First, we
obtained the average voting percentage of a given Justice from 1987
(the inception of this Study) to 1993. We then took the Justice's 1994
voting percentage and used a Pooled T-test statistic to determine
whether the 1994 score differed in a statistically significant sense from
the 1987-1993 average. If it did, we could conclude that the Justice's
1994 voting behavior was significantly different from that of past
terms."' This was done to determine whether any shifts in a given
Justice's voting behavior during the 1994 Term were statistically signif-
icant. Second, the data from 1987 to 1993 were used to form a predic-
tive model for the voting behavior on each table. We then compared
the predictions for 1994 with the actual voting behavior of each Justice
this term, and have predicted how the Justices can be expected to vote
during the 1995 Term based on prior behavorial patterns.8'
The third set of statistical tests is designed to determine whether
particular Justices tend to vote in similar (or specifically dissimilar)
ways. For instance, do Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens tend to vote
similarly (or dissimilarly) in federal criminal appeals? In reviewing
the results of this segment of the Study, however, readers should bear
in mind that we can only demonstrate relationships (or "correlations")
between and among the Justices' voting patterns. For example, while
we can show that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor tend to vote to-
gether in state civil cases, we cannot demonstrate that Justice
O'Connor's vote causes Justice Kennedy's behavior.8 3
81. For a complete explanation of the statistical methods used, see Appendix B.
82. For a complete explanation of the forecasting model used, see Appendix B.
83. "Correlation" and "causation" are distinct concepts. Correlation involves the sim-
ilar (or dissimilar) movement of two variables over different values. For instance, the cor-
relation between temperature and ice cream purchases might be highly positive for
different values of the "temperature" and "ice cream" variables. As temperature rises over
a given range (say, 85 to 105 degrees), the number of gallons of ice cream sold at a local
market might also rise proportionately. Perfect correlation occurs when a change in one
variable is matched by an equivalent change in the other-a one degree rise in tempera-
ture is matched by a one-gallon increase in ice cream sales.
If, on the other hand, a one-degree rise in temperature were matched by a one-gallon
drop in ice cream sales, the two variables would be perfectly negatively correlated. The
degree of correlation, then, is annotated by the rate of change between one variable and
the other, with +1.00 implying perfect positive correlation, and -1.00 implying perfect nega-
tive correlation. "No correlation" occurs when the rate of change between two variables
equals 0.
Causation occurs when one of two correlated variables causes the change in the other
factor. It is important to remember, however, that two highly correlated variables may
very well have absolutely no causal relationship. In other words, the perfect correlation
described above (between ice cream and temperature) may be purely incidental-the rise
in ice cream sales might be wholly due to the grocery store's going-out-of-business sale.
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This analysis yields interesting results. To begin with, only two of
the shifts in voting patterns this Term were statistically significant.
The data generated during the prior years of the Study, moreover,
were generally accurate in predicting this Term's voting behavior.
There are, finally, a few positive (and one negative) correlations be-
tween the voting patterns of the individual Justices. But, before mov-
ing to further explication of these results, readers must be cautioned
regarding the limits of a statistical analysis of a process as subjective as
Supreme Court decisionmaking.
The general reliability of statistical inference depends upon ran-
dom sampling.84 The data used here, however, were not gathered ran-
domly since the goals of this Study are to analyze a fixed number of
specific individual preferences over a limited time period. In addition,
the Court's own method of selecting cases is far from random, but is
rather the result of a conscious decisional process. Reliable statistics,
furthermore, generally require large quantities of information to pro-
duce accurate results. As the sample size gets larger, inferences be-
come more accurate.85 Again, this Study is limited to a rather small
universe: the one hundred or so decisions rendered by the entire
Court each term. From a purist's perspective, then, this Study is sub-
ject to sampling bias, both because the sample is not random and be-
cause it is comparatively small. The statistical inferences generated
below, therefore, may not accurately represent a Justice's (or the
Court's) views.
Then again, the correlation might be partially due to the sale and partially due to the high
temperature. The tension between simple correlation and causation, as well as the struggle
to delineate causal factors, is the major empirical barrier to regression inference. Accord-
ingly, regardless of the presence of high correlation between the Justices' voting patterns
on a given topic, readers should not attempt to infer causation.
84. See generally ALLEN T. CRAIG AND ROBERT V. HOGG, INTRODUCMION TO MATH-
EMATICAL STATISTICS 157-58 (1995); RAYmOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN R -
GRESSION WITH APPLICATIONS 9-11 (1990).
85. CRAIG AND HOGG, supra note 84, at 273-74.
[Vol. 23:1
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
t-
40 0 nC CC 0 0
0
0d) CD 0 0 0
0 00 CDc)-DCD c
00 6 0 0 04
6 6 6 cqT-4 -
d\ 00 c
d) e'- . = 4 en cf)
- d c14 00 Cln t
0 C,4
U ~ 03 0 %0 0
4) ) cn W r cn
c,
Ca. cd.
o. 0.1 0
w. 0
Cc..
0 0
o W 0>
So .
.0
0. r:: go
r, c
..! a) h
ii - =
0 CC )
2 cao2
0- 0.
> 0
0 0
u 3
rg L) '- *=1
0
Fall 19951
'-4
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
ci)
c i) (Z co 2) c
Z N
04 a4
00 1i0 0 .II' ~ ~ II' I
'Al A,( ~ 44 ~ ~
00
o 00 ":
ON000
r4 + +Z
+ -4 -
C1 %Di
\0
U,
-Z 700
.0 0 CN
CD)
[Vol. 23:1
0y
00
'
cs0
.0
00(2
Fall 19951 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
4 0
O1) 00 N ) C) C0
0) r- 00 C)
I-i ,-
5% N
0 t- )
in- C)~ 00j t- t k
'f -4 ND
0 CD C
s-(
0 0
o -
CO t~
g 0
Oz
w~
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
.4 .44 4
o 0 42)
0 0
O-' 40 4- w
N N
-4
as w
cr C74 N A
*=.-4*4 4  2
.4
004
N
.C
II "
T' 4
CCC
.4e,1
0
C-%00
++
00 - -r,
o6) 4 4CIO
0 00
0 (2) N C)
Ci)
>1.1
co0
.0
Co
In ti"4)'
00J ._
zz_
[Vol. 23:1v_
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
w-
40.
'00
0 0"
0)c
00
0 to ) CD cf) 0
> mO C)- cf) 0 0 C)
40.
00
o4,0
0 ~ 0.) 4) cp %
>a r-4 1-4
c...
0-
0 00
co
00
>,
Fal 1995]
.4-o
at
cu 00)0
1-4
.- I
W,
0
4-,
a' -
0 1
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
-4
~0
cq aq 'd C) N
n .C) ) C CD)
0- *Do C> CD C) -
> cd lz c o m tn
+ -4
• ,0 N ,, ) j
0- C\-4 %%D C
00 C\ -00
o s. > 00 N- 00 N- Z~
4. -0 0z 4 C-
coI-O
a )
.d 0
0
- -4
'00
4)
4) 
-4) 
.-
Jq 'N
0 0
C-1 0 *
r 1.4 1-4 -c
- 0
a0 0 0 co
Id Ou) U . '-
z
0
00 4 Q
C0 + +
+ N a
If0 -4 '
'q~ q
4) U +
°
U0 L
I.
0\ N
o
'0 0
0 4) r. .
b CIO 0) CUO
[Vol.23:1
0
Cd
0
0-
.4- w- 4o
0' U .0
V)
01 01 01 00 z
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
Utt
04) m D 0 c.
"0 No m 
-
S 0 c)(5 ) c.0
CU 9q0 I f) in
=3a 00 %6 00t %
Um 00 %.0 tn ) '.0N
1-4 ~
4-; 4)
to
1-4- M N
.4-
0c 2
cl OD)4
.0. 46C
4-1 .
co )
aU)
'0 0.
.4-
0-
4
0 0 0
04 0
4) ) 4)
r4 c tr;
-0- 0 0
N -q Ir U 0 4U
z
c 8
r :'-4
00 In0+ 65 +
'-4 ' -4+ 
+!
°0,,
U)I II IIO
4) Z Z Zc
r. 0
uo =C5 ,6 , 00
Fall 19951
ol ol OIZO12
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
40,
.0
b0.
1.9
Cd r
Q42)
0 00
0 ~ " CICQC C f
G) 00 00 %0 1in C\
0 06 C; C;
cf -4O
t0 0ci 6 C
go. 00 0
0-0
0' W
-4 . >C.
U)
'3)
O 0
'0 COc O
.-. ,41
oCc
0
o
0
(n
U)
0
O")
[Vol. 23:1
0
0
N
-4."
cdi
C2,
,- '4-
0* U
CA
0
co
U)0
N
°'4-
00
0
-4
+
I4
~0
u6
00
0
-4-
IIz
b
N
00
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
0)
*00
0 C
S0
4000
0 0 0 0)
C0 0= 000 CD
> ~ ' 66 CD ~ C)a)C
40)
09
)0
.0 M
U'2)
ob" ki t - t -3 T4
> f O\ t0 tn 00
4)
d.- 0 0 0
4-4 ,-4 c5 '
~0 0 n C
~ .,,
0
0.)
4)
_________________ ________ ______________ I.
Fall 19951
U,
4-4
I'N
cu
0
Ij8
1-
'-4-
II
z
r,1
00
o
Go
%-,o
0
C0
U,
C5
o.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Co~ colio
as0
r4 ~ 1 6 C5 CO; 06
4R4
to
a) -iw 0
a0 Cd 0 ' C ) 4 C
>
o - bb C, CO, xr C6 CO
co~
L :b0
a.4
rAa
- ab
[Vol. 23:1
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
r r T
.4) C4 CA) Mi
CA) Ci Ch) Ci
4) 4) 4) 4)
* . 4- 4-.0 0 0 0
0. 0. O3 0.
N N N N
IfN IN 1fI -'- II
' 0 '0
44 4-4 4-4 4
0i 0 i 0 0
r-f~- Cq'-
•>
00 00~ T46o +
+ + N-
900 cq 4
II II II
z z z
;44
co 0 0o
1-4 1 - 1 4
4)- 4 4)d
c I r-4 C4
-. iI Ie
00
C-4
c1
u
II
0
o 0
0.
03 co
.1 . 0
00 %i '0
~ 4- + 4-
0 ~ 0
0*q C) r- Ci)
'-1 '-, 1-1-
cti
o ..
Ci)
02
N4)
Ofi
00. 0
Ijo
'-O
4- 4.-
\0 00
N N
+ +
6
II II
C) 000
c n 4 ) N 6 ' O- 1o ' ~ e f
) -e c
C- 4) 0 C) 00 r4)
0 +00 p 00 00 ON C5 00
4Z ) w ) 0 1--
Q 4 4)4
4) 0
-) _ _ _ _ o__ 0
Fall 19951
0
44
c0
0-
C)
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
o
.0 i e .0 N 2
1-4
i
10
0. w. ~ i .
. . '4- Inl
.N
0s i0 00 CO W
o W) 'nn N n
0 0
r4 \ C*1-~4 0 %
,a Cr\ '.0 n 0-r- W
C4 in \.o 'I in
t00 0
04- 0\ \ t
o - co c l6 nt
a) r, 0 0 0q 0 0
--
[Vol. 23:1
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
a) a) a)Q
-s -s 's -3
o o as4.
-O<U
-0, - 0
tn m 44 N~*'~
0"0 U) n EU)A00 V.~
'o0 ~ 0 = '0 co0
'. CZ CZ CU Z:CU
L43 =) En = 0~ 0)O C
I I
06
V-4 ++ N'.oq o>
II II
cli
Q0 0
0 '.
z
N)
c'i u
00)
ji\0
.0C
.4 .4
0 0
S0
1.4
a)a0
CU C6 *-
Ifl 1)0 14-
co cd CZ 03 *~ r.
- * - CU 1
C- -4
00 000
0~) 6 ; v-- 0)c
0-00 00 ON
Z .4.
U a)
as a-)
cd a)
-a__ _ _ -ca I
Fall 19951
U)1
° o
o~a
U)
0
CIS
N -
,4-4
'cn
.4-=
0'U
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
o on 1-4" o c
Ci 00
0000
C) C Cl D CD
5, 00 \"0 \10 1fn xf
0'2
'00
'2)0
'-4 ,-
4-40C
Cd
.0
4-o4
0 ).-a c 00 en ~ 'D)0 z 0 6 O\ 000 C
> 00 t-~ r -~ 0 i
o 000
4 od c4
- ~ 0 t 1a o , " ~4OR ~ ~ Ln 14 Z ctC\~
ON
O" 0
4-4 ')
o -
00
4
. 0
o o
422
4- :3
5-
0
.- 4
-S ,S
C.,
0
0
U)Uo
o4-
.4
0
o
1- *
N
-- 4-c
0
C5
0
-/
4- 4-.
~ 0 .~
'*0 ~ w ~
~ 0 ~ .~ ~2)
U)
o t~)
___ ~ 0000 -~ _
[Vol. 23:1
ol 0
z I z
B. Analysis
Regression Table 1: Civil-State Party
Regression analysis of Table 1 shows that none of the five ex-
amined Justices exhibited a statistically significant shift in voting be-
havior. Indeed, there were only two statistically significant shifts on
any of the tables this Term.92 This, of course, suggests that the overall
liberal trend noted this Term at most represents a moderation rather
than an alteration of the Court's attitudinal stance. The Court re-
mains basically conservative, although the addition of Justices Gins-
burg and Breyer may have moved the Court as a whole somewhat
toward the "middle of the road."
The table also shows that data generated by this Study from 1987
through 1993 was relatively accurate in predicting the 1994 voting pat-
terns of the five analyzed Justices. The greatest variation from the
predicted score is seen in the outcome for Justice Stevens, who voted
approximately five points more often for state government than prior
years' data would suggest. This renegade result for Justice Stevens
holds true on most of the regression tables set out below: his actual
voting pattern rather consistently demonstrates one of the greatest
variations from predicted outcomes.93 This outcome may lend some
credence to the opinion occasionally expressed at Washington, D.C.
cocktail parties that Justice Stevens' votes are exceptionally difficult to
forecast.94
Regression Table 1 also shows a high positive correlation in Jus-
tice Kennedy's tendency to vote with Justices O'Connor and Chief
Justice Rehnquist in state civil cases. The correlation with Justice
O'Connor is particularly strong. Indeed, regression analysis suggests
that Justice O'Connor's vote is linked with that of Justice Kennedy in
roughly 80% of the cases analyzed in Table 1.95
Regression Table 2: Civil-Federal Party
The data on Regression Table 2 were not as accurate as those on
Regression Table 1 in predicting voting behavior in 1994. Justice
92. See Regression Table 2.
93. The exception is Regression Table 9, Federalism, where the predicted score more
accurately predicts Justice Stevens' behavior than that of the other Justices.
94. One of the authors of this Study, Richard G. Wilkins, heard that opinion expressed
several times at informal legal gatherings during his tenure as Assistant to the Solicitor
General from 1981 through 1984.
95. See infra text accompanying note 93. We have excluded correlations where the
statistical reliability is questionable. As shown on the Regression Tables, we accepted only
those scores that ranged either below a -0.7 or above +0.7.
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O'Connor voted nearly nine points less often, Justice Scalia nearly six
points less often, and Justice Stevens about thirteen points more often
for the federal government than prior years' data suggested. While
this outcome lends some support to the notion that the Court is re-
orienting itself to the political stance of the Clinton Administration
(with Justice Stevens voting in favor of and Justices O'Connor and
Scalia against the Administration), none of these variations are statis-
tically significant. The forecast of the voting patterns of the other two
Justices, moreover, were fairly accurate. 9 6
The data demonstrates that Justice Kennedy's voting behavior is
rather highly correlated with that of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Scalia. The correlation with Justice Scalia is particularly strong.
Regression analysis shows that Justice Kennedy joins Justice Scalia in
federal civil cases approximately 80% of the time. There is also a pos-
itive correlation between the voting pattern of the Chief Justice in fed-
eral civil cases and Justice Scalia. But, while the initial correlation is
rather positive (0.742), regression analysis shows that Justice Scalia's
vote explains the variability in the Chief Justice's vote only 47.6% of
the time.
Table 2, finally, has one other statistic of some interest. The
movement in voting behaviors exhibited by Justices O'Connor and
Scalia on Table 2 is the only statistically significant movement uncov-
ered this Term. Both Justices, in 1994, voted significantly less often
for the federal government than would have been expected based on
their voting patterns in prior years. This movement suggests that the
litigating posture of the current Administration is, indeed, inconsistent
with the ideological bent of these two Members of the Court.9 7
Regression Table 3: State Criminal Cases
Regression Table 3 demonstrates that, with the exceptions of Jus-
tice Stevens (who departed approximately six points from his pre-
dicted voting pattern) and Justice Kennedy (whose erratic voting
behavior on this table precludes any 1994 or 1995 Term predictions),98
data from prior years has been rather accurate in predicting the voting
behavior of the longest-tenured members of the Court. This suggests
96. Furthermore, all of the predictions on Regression Table 2 are relatively accurate
by objective statistical standards.
97. See discussion of Table 2, supra note 96, and accompanying text.
98. Justice Kennedy's voting pattern on Table 3 has not been consistent. Our forecast-
ing model was unable to predict a score for the Justice, even though the forecasting al-
gorithm was programmed to attempt a prediction pattern 25 different ways. See Appendix
B.
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that, at least as far as the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and
Scalia are concerned, the 1995 Term will follow the approximate vot-
ing patterns demonstrated this year. There are, however, no positive
or negative correlations between the voting patterns of the individual
Justices in state criminal cases.
Regression Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases
Regression Table 4 suggests that none of the five Justices made
any statistically significant shifts. However, with the exception of the
Chief Justice and Justice Stevens, the table indicates that this Study is
rather accurate at predicting voting behavior in federal criminal
cases. 99 Indeed, Justice Kennedy's predicted score of 61.1195 % varied
only 0.4205% from his actual 1994 voting pattern, where he cast
61.54% of his votes in favor of the federal government.
Furthermore, it appears that Justice Scalia's voting is positively
correlated with that of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. This correla-
tion, however, is not extreme. Regression analysis shows that Justice
Kennedy's vote is linked to the variability in Justice Scalia's vote only
57% of the time, while Justice O'Connor's vote is linked to variations
in Justice Scalia's vote approximately 52% of the time. Accordingly,
the positive correlation between the voting pattern of Justice Scalia
and the other two Justices individually is not particularly strong.
However, when Justices Kennedy and O'Connor vote together in fed-
eral criminal cases, Justice Scalia joins them 63% of the time.
Regression Table 5: First Amendment
Regression Table 5 indicates that of the five Justices examined,
Justice Scalia departed most from his predicted performance in the
First Amendment arena, voting approximately nine percentage points
less often in favor of First Amendment claims than could have been
predicted based on data from prior years. Justice Stevens was the next
least predictable Justice, reducing his predicted receptivity to First
Amendment claims by some six percentage points. Justice Scalia's re-
suits tend to weaken the hypothesis that he is likely to embrace First
Amendment claims when championed by politically conservative ad-
vocates as in this term, although the hypothesis is supported by Justice
99. While Justice Stevens varied some six percentage points, and the Chief Justice
some seven percentage points, from their predicted scores, neither variance is statistically
significant.
Fall 19951
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Steven's downward departure from his expected score.1°° However,
neither Justice Scalia's nor Justice Stevens' sudden First Amendment
reticence is statistically significant. Any statistical argument, there-
fore, should not be overstated.
Regression Table 5 also shows rather strong correlations between
the voting behavior of the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor. Indeed, regression analysis demonstrates that the Chief
Justice joins Justice Kennedy on approximately 71% and Justice
O'Connor on 59% of the First Amendment issues addressed by the
Court. Moreover, when Justices Kennedy and O'Connor vote to-
gether on the First Amendment, the Chief Justice joins them nearly
86% of the time. This voting bloc, therefore, could be a rather signifi-
cant target for First Amendment litigators.
Regression Table 6: Equal Protection
The results of Regression Table 6 show somewhat more variabil-
ity between predicted and actual outcomes than the other regression
tables. 1' 1 This may well result from the exceptionally small universe
of equal protection cases - only three cases this term and one case last
term. However, while any inferences from this table must be drawn
with caution, both Justices Kennedy and Scalia voted nearly 16 per-
centage points more often in favor of equal protection claims this term
than was predicted on the basis of data from prior years. This may
indicate that these Justices are more willing to accept equal protection
claims when raised by politically conservative advocates. 02 This as-
sertion, however, should not be pressed too strongly since neither Jus-
tice's equal protection voting pattern in 1994 demonstrated
statistically significant movement.
Regression Table 6 also indicates that Justice Kennedy's voting
pattern is rather highly correlated to that of Justice O'Connor. Re-
gression analysis indicates that Justice O'Connor's vote is linked to
Justice Kennedy's equal protection vote approximately 73% of the
100. See e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510
(1995) (upholding First Amendment claim raised by religiously oriented student publica-
tion); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995) (up-
holding free speech claim against defense that allowing the restricted speech would violate
the Establishment Clause).
101. Chief Justice Rehnquist's voting pattern on Regression Table 6, moreover, is insuf-
ficiently stable to permit computation of predicted outcomes for 1994 and 1995.
102. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding all
governmental racial classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny); Miller v. Johnson,
115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (congressional redistricting plan may not focus solely on the constit-
uents' race).
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time. The Chief Justice's equal protection vote is even more highly
correlated with that of Justice Scalia. Regression testing shows that
the Chief Justice joins Justice Scalia approximately 92% of the time in
resolving equal protection issues.
Regression Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights
As with state criminal cases, Justice Kennedy's past stance on
statutory civil rights issues has been so unstable that no statistical pre-
diction of his voting pattern can be made for the 1994 or 1995 Terms.
The predicted 1994 outcomes for the other Justices, however, were
rather accurate with the possible exception of Justice Stevens.103
Moreover, despite the instability of Justice Kennedy's voting pat-
tern in this area, there is a rather strong positive correlation between
his statutory civil rights vote and that of Justice Scalia. Regression
analysis, in fact, demonstrates that Justice Kennedy's vote in statutory
civil rights cases is linked to that of Justice Scalia about 63% of the
time.
Regression Table 8: Jurisdiction
Regression Table 8 demonstrates a high level of stability between
and among the voting patterns of the five Justices analyzed. With the
exception of Justice Stevens (who varied from his predicted score by.
nearly 11 percentage points), each Justice's actual voting percentage
on jurisdictional issues was very close to the predictions for 1994.
There is, moreover, a high degree of correlation between virtually all
five Justices. Justice Kennedy's jurisdictional votes, for example, are
highly correlated to those of the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Stevens. These five members of the Court, therefore,
often vote as a bloc on jurisdictional questions.
Regression Table 9: Federalism
Regression Table 9 demonstrates that the data of prior years were
not as accurate in predicting federalism votes this year. While the
Chief Justice's and Justice O'Connor's and Stevens' predicted scores
were rather close to their actual voting patterns, the other two Justices
departed somewhat from the predicted behavior. This indicates some
present instability on the Court regarding federalism issues. None of
this movement, however, is statistically significant.
103. The difference between Justice Stevens' actual and predicted score was 6.6041%.
This gap, however, while clearly greater than that of any other Justice for which a predic-
tion could be computed, is still not statistically significant.
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As for correlation, Regression Table 9 demonstrates that the
votes of four of the five Justices-the Chief Justice and Justices Ken-
nedy, O'Connor, and Scalia-are highly correlated. 4 Indeed, only
Justice Stevens stands alone in the federalism area, with his votes
showing neither positive nor negative correlation with the other four
Justices.10 5 This result may well indicate that there is a four-member
bloc, comprised of the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
and Scalia, which tends to vote similarly on federalism issues.
Regression Table 10: Swing Votes
Regression Table 10 is difficult to interpret. To begin with, in
comparison with the other regression tables, this table exhibits rather
high differences between the predicted 1994 voting behaviors and the
actual voting patterns of the five examined Justices. Furthermore, two
members of the Court, the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens, have ex-
hibited such erratic behavior in "swing vote" cases that no predicted
values could be computed for 1994 and 1995. These outcomes, how-
ever, are hardly surprising.
If the outcome in "swing vote" cases is, as we assume, more
highly influenced by ideology than the rest of the Court's docket, sta-
tistical predictions on Regression Table 10 are likely to be particularly
unstable. As noted above, the validity of any statistical analysis de-
pends upon random sampling of a large universe. The Court's selec-
tion of the difficult cases it will review is hardly random. The
troublesome cases that ultimately result in five-to-four outcomes are
not drawn out of a hat, but rather, are consciously selected by the
individual members of the Court. Nor is the universe of such cases
particularly large. This term, we included only fourteen cases on Ta-
ble 10. As a result, statistical analysis of the outcome of five-to-four
decisions on the Court is particularly prone to error.
Nevertheless, one notable statistic on Regression Table 10 is the
very high negative correlation (the only negative correlation uncov-
ered by this Study) between the voting behaviors of the Chief Justice
and Justice Stevens. Indeed, regression analysis demonstrates that in
swing vote cases the Chief Justice can be expected to vote in opposi-
tion to Justice Stevens approximately 71.4% of the time. This suggests
104. The last regression for Justice O'Connor produced a model whose individual ele-
ments did not, by themselves, have any noticeable effect on the variance in O'Connor's
voting.
105. Justice Stevens was not included in Regression Table 9 because his correlation
scores did not meet the requirements for reliability. See supra note 93.
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that in close cases, the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens are ideologi-
cal opposites.
V. Conclusion
This Term's data indicates that the Rehnquist Court is moderat-
ing its course. While the present Court is still a conservative institu-
tion, there was a discernable liberal trend in 1994 in seven of the ten
categories of cases examined by this Study. While some of this "lib-
eral" movement might be attributable to politically conservative Jus-
tices siding with the anti-government positions of politically
conservative litigants, that explanation is probably too facile to ex-
plain the broad-based reversal of the trend demonstrated by the 1994
data. The Rehnquist Court, while hardly a liberal juggernaut, may
well have reached its conservative apex by becoming less, not more,
conservative.
This year's data also show that (as with the 1993 Term) Justice
Kennedy remains the single most influential Justice on the Court, with
his vote determining the outcome of 81.25% of the Court's most
closely divided opinions. Regression analysis demonstrates that there
are several positive correlations (and one negative correlation) be-
tween the voting patterns of the five longest-tenured Justices. This
analysis shows that litigants with a First Amendment issue before the
Court would do well to pay special attention to the possible concerns
of the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. If the case
is closely divided, however, and if the hypothetical litigant succeeds in
garnering the vote of the Chief Justice, Regression Table 10 indicates
that the advocate will almost certainly lose the vote of Justice Stevens.
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Appendix A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those 1994 Term
cases decided by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been ex-
cluded even if accompanied by an opinion. Cases handled by sum-
mary disposition are included only if they are accompanied by a full
opinion of the Court and not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases
decided by a four-four vote, hence resulting in affirmance without
written opinion have been excluded. Both signed and per curiam
opinions are considered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a
more than perfunctory manner. Cases not fitting within any of these
categories are not included in the database for any of the tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a prob-
lem of classification. No cases in 1994 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Tables I through 4
Cases are included in Tables 1 through 4 only if governmental and
private entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily true of
criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these tables if they do
not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity might be the
United States government, one of its agencies or officials, or, with re-
spect to a state government, one of its political subdivisions. A suit
against a government official in a personal capacity is included if that
official is represented by government attorneys, or if the interests of
the government are otherwise clearly implicated. In instances of mul-
tiple parties, a civil case is excluded if governmental entities appear on
both sides of the controversy. If both a state and a federal entity are
parties to the same suit on the same side with only private parties on
the other, the case is included in Tables 1 and 2. A case is included
more than once in the same table if it raises two or more distinct is-
sues affecting the outcome of the case and the issues are resolved by
different voting alignments.
4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Tables 5 through 9 for
which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written opinion.
One case may thus be included in two or more tables. A case is also
included more than once in the same table if it raises two or more
distinct issues in the category affecting the disposition of the case and
the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A case is not
included for any issue raised by one of the litigants which is not ad-
dressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and equal protection issues
poses no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press, associa-
tion, and free exercise of religion are included. However, Establish-
ment Clause cases are excluded since one party's claim of religious
establishment is often arrayed against another party's claim of free
exercise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of indi-
vidual rights.
Statutory civil rights cases included in Table 7 are limited to those
invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
and other civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination on the
basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or physical
handicap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the
substantive right asserted is based on a federal statute, or if the issue
involves how to apply section 1983 in the case at hand. However, sec-
tion 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right asserted is based
on the United States Constitution and the issue relates to that consti-
tutional right. The purpose of the section 1983 exclusion is to pre-
serve a distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional
claims.
For Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include not
only jurisdiction per se but also standing, mootness, ripeness, absten-
tion, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional questions
are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no member of
the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court may com-
ment on its jurisdiction.
Federalism cases in Table 9 are limited to those cases in which
there were issues raised by conflicting actions of federal and state or
local governments. Common examples of these issues are preemp-
tion, inter-governmental immunities, application of the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments as a limit on federal government action, and
federal court interference with state court activities (other than review
of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism or inter-
state relationships, such as those raised by the dormant Commerce
Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, are excluded from the
table.
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5. The "Swing-Vote" Cases
Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a single
vote. This category also is intended to include four-three decisions, if
any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions resulting in reversal
of a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-three or four-
two are not included because a shift of one vote from the majority to
the minority position would still result in affirmance by a tie vote. A
case is included more than once in the table if it raises two or more
distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case and the issues are
resolved by different voting alignments.
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Appendix B: Quantitative Foundations
A. Student's t Testing106
Data from 1987 to 1993 were used to compute an initial mean
value (xbarl). 1994 results were then added, and the resulting data set
was used to produce a new mean value (xbar2). The following hypoth-
eses were tested using a student's t statistic:
H: p = xbar,
Ha: p xbar,
The applicable test statistic was articulated by the formula
X2-/fl
t-Y
where t-Student's t(n.k)10 7 and p is, by null hypothesis, xbarl. A rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis by any t-statistic had to imply that the vot-
ing proportion for 1994 shifted p from its previous value on the real
number line. This test statistic requires two assumptions:
1) the sample from which the data is drawn is simple and random;
and,
2) the parent population being sampled follows a normal distribu-
tion; in other words, X-N(p, o2).
For small sample sizes, the Student's t procedure is not robust with
regard to assumptional departures.
B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model, in which a given Jus-
tice's voting is first expressed as Y, and then is differenced, producing
Y*:
The general forecasting model for Y* is written as
Y*t = 01Y*t-I+0Y*t-+ .. +0pY*t.p+Et+OlEt-l+2t-2+ .+OqEt-q
where the 4 and 0 are unknown parameters and the d are in-
dependent and identically distributed normal errors with zero
mean [ei-N(p=O; q2]. Note that this model expresses Y* in terms
only of its past values along with current and past errors; there
are no explanatory variables as there would be in a traditional
106. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see MooRE and McCABE, supra
note 87, 500-18 (1993). See also CRAIG AND HoGG, supra note 84.
107. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, p is the only hypothesized param-
eter, so k = 1.
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regression] model. This general model is called an ARIMA
p,d,q) model for y.108
Here, p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1.
C. Correlation and Regression Analysis
The positive changes in the ice cream example, supra, may be
mapped over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane, with the slope, or
rate of change, between the two variables being positive. If, for every
one unit "rise" in temperature, there is a one unit "run" in ice cream,
perfect correlation exists between the two variables. Algebraically,
then, the slope between the two factors is the "rise" divided by the
"run" (or 1/1 [=1]). The term "unitary" or "perfect" correlation re-
sults from this slope of +1.00.
If a rise in one factor is matched by a quantitative equivalent fall
in the other, perfect negative correlation occurs; the two variables
share a slope of -1.00. In the ice cream example, then, a one-degree
rise is matched by a one-degree drop.
Linear regression is, in its most simple form, an attempt to accu-
rately estimate the true values of the slope between two or more vari-
ables.10 9 However, one crucial difference between simple correlation
and regression is the presumption of causation. A linear regression
model is one that attempts to use one (or more) explanatory, or "in-
dependent," variables to explain the variance in one "dependent" va-
riable. Most linear regression computer results test the hypothesis
that the estimated parameters, or /3s, are equivalent to 0. Of course,
the analyst typically desires such a result not to occur-in other words,
she wants the data to summarily reject the statistical test of this hy-
pothesis.110 It is important to remember, though, that neither a rejec-
108. PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONoMETRIcs 248-49 (1992).
109. The moment an analyst starts speaking about multivariate regression, most people
(especially lawyers) start to run screaming out of the lecture room. However, the princi-
ples remain the same, with the only difference being a corresponding increase (no pun
intended) between the number of variables and the number of dimensions on the Carte-
sian coordinate plane.
110. In its most simple form, a basic regression model posits the following relationship:
y--PO+Px+E
where y is the dependent variable, x is the independent variable, Po (the intercept term)
and fil (the slope term for x) are the true slope parameters for the equation, and E is the
error term (the difference between the predicted value of the equation and y term's actual
value). One of the tenets of regression theory is that - is distributed according to a Gaus-
sian probability between a predicted "y" and an actual "y" is 0 (on the average). While
there are different methods of estimating fi in a regression setting, the easiest involves
using the Ordinary Least Squares estimation procedure. As interesting as the proof for
least-squares regression might be, such an intellectual exercise would (regrettably) be a
[Vol. 23:1
tion of the null hypothesis that fl equals 0111 or a high r2 (adjusted)
statistic" 2 imply causation. Justice Scalia's voting record might corre-
late quite highly with that of Justice Stevens on Equal Protection top-
ics. That does not, however, imply that Justice Scalia causes Justice
Stevens to vote the way that he does.
In closing, there are five assumptions necessary for a valid classi-
cal regression model:
1) The dependent variable may be calculated as a linear function
of one or more independent variables.
2) The mean value of the disturbance term e (the difference be-
tween observed and expected dependent variable values) is 0.
3) The variance of the disturbance term is constant
(homoskedasticity).
4) Observations of independent variables are fixed with regard to
repeated sampling.
5),The number of observations is greater than the number of in-
dependent variables, and there are no linear relationships between in-
dependent variables (multicollinearity).1 3
The modeling completed in this project failed to meet the second,
third, fourth, and fifth assumptions of classical linear regression.
However, results were usually accurate enough to assume some de-
gree of robustness with regard to assumptional departures, at least
from an empirical perspective.
substantial digression from the topic of this paper. Interested readers are encouraged to
consult Kennedy's excellent book on econometrics regression techniques. See KENNEDY,
supra note 108 (App. B), at 44-51; see also WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
148, 154 (1993). The regressions carried out in this project used the least-squares method
to estimate fPs; computer modeling was accomplished using the MINITAB and SHAZAM!
Statistical software packages.
111. More formally, H0: fli=0 and, by inference, the alternative test hypothesis that fli0
(H,: fli -0) are tested as t statistics, where ti is distributed as a Student's t with degrees of
freedom equivalent to n (the sample size) minus k (the number of slope parameters, or Ps).
112. The r2 statistic is an estimate of p2, the true measure of correlation between the
dependent variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r2 value in the fol-
lowing tables is a result of the computer's attempts to filter out any statistical bias in the
original r2 result.
113. See KENNEDY, supra note 108 (App.B), at 43-44.
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